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Co-evolution of Information Processing Technology and Use:
Interaction between the Life Insurance and Tabulating Industries
In 1890, at the invitation of inventor Herman Hollerith, 25 members of the Actuarial
Society of America attended a demonstration of a new type of information-handling equipment: the
punched-card tabulator. According to a news account of the meeting, the life insurance actuaries
attended because "Any labor-saving device that can be used in the preparation of tabular statements
is of interest to actuaries." l Their interest was justified by the magnitude of the information-
handling tasks faced by their life insurance firms. The largest firms already had millions of
policies, leading to many times that number of statistical analyses and transactions involving those
policies. This meeting between Hollerith and the actuaries marked the beginning of what was to be
a decades-long interaction between two industries: the punched-card tabulating industry and the life
insurance industry. 2
The tabulating industry, embryonic at the time of this meeting, would be dominated in the
U.S. by two firms: the firm founded by Hollerith became the core of IBM; that founded by
Hollerith's main rival, James Powers, became part of Remington Rand. These two firms would
become major players in the early commercial computer industry midway through the twentieth
century. Although historians studying forerunners of the computer have often mentioned
Hollerith's tabulating equipment, especially in the context of his Census work,3 the industry it
spawned has only recently received the closer attention it deserves for its role in establishing and
developing the data processing market that computers would later inherit. Recent treatments have
begun to explore business use of tabulating equipment before World War II, as well as the function
of the business market in the growth of the tabulating equipment industry in the U.S. and Britain.4
The present study moves the analysis down into a single industry, life insurance, and looks at both
the shaping influence of tabulating machinery on insurance firms' business processes and the role
that insurance as a user industry has played in shaping the development of tabulating technology.
The life insurance industry, the second industry represented in the 1890 meeting noted
above, is particularly interesting for these purposes because of its information-intensive nature. 5
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For such an industry, information technology is essentially its production technology--the
technology by which it produces the information and documents that are its only products. During
the first half of the twentieth century, tabulating equipment became an increasingly central part of
the life insurance business, transforming its processes and paving the way for later
computerization. The insurance firms initially adopted basic tabulating systems to mechanize
existing and primarily manual processes of sorting, counting, and adding data; as the capabilities of
the technology evolved, leading firms developed new ways of using it to integrate data processing
with the production of documents. At the same time, as an early and major customer of the
tabulating industry, the insurance industry influenced inventions and commercial developments in
tabulating technology in directions that allowed that evolving use just described. In recent years
researchers in management of innovation and economic history have highlighted the role of users
in shaping technical innovations.6 This study of the life insurance industry as it interacted with the
tabulating industry reveals an array of specific strategies and mechanisms--ranging from the
market, on the one hand, to direct user invention and development, on the other--by which leading
insurance firms and industry groups shaped tabulating technology and the tabulating industry.
Of course, life insurance was not the only industry using and influencing tabulating
technology. In Hollerith's early developments, the U.S. Census and the railroads played a major
role. Later, accounting uses spanning industries also had an interest in numerical printing abilities,
and utilities, like life insurance, desired alphabetical printing capabilities. Other industries, such as
banking and state governments, also were large users. The Hughesian technological system7 (with
its social and organizational as well as technical elements) of tabulating technology would include
these other major user industries, and study of them would surely highlight other influences. But
focusing on the perspective of one major user industry from Hollerith's early days of
commercialization on to the verge of the computer age allows us to understand the interaction
between user-influenced technological innovation and the new uses allowed by the evolving
technology. Moreover, the study views the tabulating industry primarily as it interacts with the life
insurance industry, and thus provides only a circumscribed Chandlerian picture of competitive
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developments within the tabulating industry.8 The primary purpose of this account is to illuminate
the co-evolution of tabulating technology and its use within life insurance, and the co-evolution of
the tabulating industry with the life insurance industry. 9
After briefly describing some of the salient features of the U.S. life insurance business and
its information needs, I will describe the origin and nature of tabulating technology. The rest of the
paper is divided into three major phases: the period of insurance's initial adoption of tabulating
technology, up to 1910; the next decade's push to acquire printing capabilities; and the evolution
and incorporation of alphabetical tabulating capabilities in the 1920s and early 1930s.
The American Life Insurance Industry
Although life insurance was well established in England in the early nineteenth century, the
American life insurance industry only took off in the 1840s. 10 Initially, what came to be called
ordinary insurance, in which policies were written for relatively large amounts and premiums
were generally paid yearly, by mail or in person at the insurance office, was the focus of the
industry. In the 1850s, the British insurance industry introduced industrial insurance, which
offered small policies on the lives of industrial workers and their families, with very small
premiums collected weekly at the worker's home by sales agents assigned to a particular
geographical area or debit. In the late years of the nineteenth century the American insurance
industry followed the British lead in establishing industrial insurance. While both segments of the
industry were based on the same actuarial principles, the operating aspects of the two segments
differed significantly. Industrial insurance involved many more transactions for much smaller
amounts (e.g., a dime a week), making it inherently more costly to provide and thus more
expensive (per dollar of insurance) to the buyer. From the beginning, controlling costs was,
therefore, especially important for the largest providers of industrial insurance such as Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and Prudential Insurance Company in the U.S. and the Prudential
Assurance Company in Britain (unrelated to the American firm). These lead users, in von Hippel's
terms and in accordance with his theory, were to play major roles in the user-driven technological
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innovation that is a key part of the reciprocal interaction discussed in this paper. 1 1
By the turn of the twentieth century life insurance had become very big business in the
U.S., with the largest firms handling policies valued at over $1 billion, having assets over $250
million, and receiving over $30 million in premium income each year. All were regulated by the
states, but not by the federal government). The five largest firms included three that handled only
ordinary insurance (New York Life Insurance Company, Mutual Life Insurance Company, and
Equitable Life Assurance Society) along with the two industrial insurance companies already
mentioned (Metropolitan and Prudential), which also handled ordinary insurance. Many insurance
firms, including Metropolitan and Prudential, were (or became by early in the century) mutual
companies in which any profits were redistributed among policyholders. 12
Thus most large insurance companies, unlike railroads and manufacturing firms, were not
driven to adopt new methods of management and supporting techniques and technologies of
information by crises of profitability, per se.13 Nevertheless, the firms felt the need to keep costs
down in order to fulfill their public service mandate, to keep regulators satisfied, and to remain
price competitive so they could continue to grow. Competition was still stiff for market share
(generally expressed in terms of value of insurance in force), if not for profit, and firms were
acutely aware of competitive rankings.14 Cost containment was particularly important for the
growth of industrial insurance, where costs of doing business were higher and the incomes of
those insured much lower. State legislation, combined with market trends, enabled the two biggest
industrial insurance firms, which ranked fourth and fifth in 1900, to move ahead of the three
leading ordinary insurance firms, taking over first and second places by 1915.15
Information Processing Needs of Life Insurance
Turn-of-the-century life insurance firms had to manage a variety of different types and
forms of information for many policies (the largest firms handled tens of thousands of ordinary
insurance policies or several millions of industrial policies). While a complete catalog would be far
too long to include here, a review of the most basic processes illustrates the nature of the industry.
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For the ordinary insurance policy-holder, firms received and processed applications and
their supporting documents, prepared and transmitted a written policy, issued notices of premium
payments due at regular intervals, processed and sent receipts for premium payments, monitored
missed payments to reduce lapses, responded to inquiries, received and processed claims, and
issued payments on claims. For agents and district offices, they maintained accurate records of
policies serviced (by agent and by district), responded to inquiries about policies, figured
commissions, distributed pay, and maintained employment records. In industrial insurance, while
firms did not mail out premium notices, they maintained the necessary records to guide agents in
weekly collections of small payments from policyholders, provided some form of receipt for
payments, handled remittance of collections to the firm, credited payments to the policyholder's
account, and monitored missed payments, which could occur 52 times a year rather than once, to
try to prevent policy lapses. For actuarial purposes, they maintained information about the person
insured by each policy (e.g., age, health, occupation), supported the extraction of data on a variety
of these dimensions, calculated many statistics based on the data, and developed or modified
products based on them. To meet varying regulatory requirements of the various states, they
computed and reported a variety of statistics on policies (e.g., value of policies and reserve
requirements by state) and on the firm's financial transactions (including its investments). For
internal management purposes they maintained a cost accounting system, personnel records, sales
records, financial accounts, agency accounts, and so on. 16
Even this superficial listing (which omits many factors such as loans on policies, changes
to existing policies, and distributions to policy-holders in mutualized firms) is enough to make
clear the magnitude of the information handling required. It also suggests what one speaker at an
insurance convention called "the outstanding characteristic of the life insurance office; that is, the
repetition of the same data and same transactions in the various records and statistics. From the
very moment a policy is issued this repetition stays with it until the ultimate termination of the
policy." 17 This characteristic was combined with the high level of accuracy necessary to give
individuals good service over the long lifetime of the policy--a much higher level of accuracy than
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was required in Census statistics, for example, and an active lifetime of records that could easily
exceed half a century. It is also evident from the above listing that many types and enormous
numbers of documents were generated to handle this business. Some, such as the records of
policies serviced by a particular agent, were solely for internal use, while others, such as the
policies, premium notices, and receipts, served as the link between the insurance firm and the
customer. All of these characteristics influenced company decisions about tabulating technology, as
well as the industry's overall approach to information technology.
The Origin and Nature of Punched-card Tabulating Technology
Tabulating technology was initially developed by Herman Hollerith to speed up processing
of data collected in the 1890 U.S. Census. Hollerith saw the potential for commercial customers
early, and made a few limited contacts with prospects such as railroads and insurance firms. Only
after he lost the business of the U.S. Census around the turn of the century, however, did he focus
his attention on developing this market. 18
Tabulating systems, originally so called because they aided in producing tables of census
data, included devices for punching, sorting, and counting or adding quantities on cards. 19 Figure
1 illustrates Hollerith's original versions of the three devices; Figure 2 shows later, more
characteristic versions. The card punch was initially a pantograph punch with a swinging arm and a
perforated metal plate to guide the pin into predetermined positions; later this version was replaced
by a key-operated device. The initial census system used cards divided into irregular fields with
customized letter or number codes in each punching position. In the 1890s, working with his first
commercial customer, the New York Central Railroad, Hollerith developed a more standardized
format with multiple columns each having digits from 0 to 9. A group of columns, or a field,
represented a number of more than one decimal digit. From the early twentieth century to the late
1920s, 45-column cards were standard (see Figure 3).
Hollerith's original electro-mechanical tabulator (the tabulator designation was attached to
the counting device itself as well as to the entire system) was a hand-fed press attached to counter
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wheels. Using pins and tiny cups of mercury to complete circuits, this device simply counted cards
with particular holes or combinations of holes punched. In his work for the Census and for the
New York Central Railroad in the 1890s, Hollerith developed accumulators for adding totals in
predefined fields, rather than simply counting cards. This increase in functionality greatly increased
the potential uses of the equipment. During the processing of the 1900 Census he introduced
tabulators that automatically fed the cards, thus improving the speed of the tabulating process.
At the time of the 1890 Census, sorting occurred as a quasi-manual by-product of
counting. A primitive sorting box was attached to the tabulator. At the same time that the operator
used the press to read some pre-set field on the card during the counting operation, holes punched
in another pre-set field on the card also activated one of two dozen lids on the sorting box via an
electrical connection; that lid flew open, and the operator placed the card into the box and closed the
lid. This sorting prepared cards for the next tabulating run. Using the sorting box clearly slowed
down the speed at which cards could be run through the tabulator, forming a "reverse salient" in
the terminology of Thomas P. Hughes. 2 0 In fact, it was so slow that users often sorted cards
using a knitting needle pushed through a specified hole. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
Hollerith introduced a separate sorting machine to sort cards into 11 groups by the value (0 to 9 or
no punch), in a given column.
Insurance and Tabulating before 1910
It was possible to handle the information tasks required by large insurance firms with few
mechanical aids, as Campbell-Kelly's description of the clerical methods used by the British
Prudential from the 1870s well into the twentieth century demonstrates. 2 1 In American firms, he
notes by contrast, an initial wave of office technology had been adopted by 1910, giving them an
array of mechanical and electrical devices to aid in handling information: adding and calculating
machines, dictaphones, photostats, typewriters, telephones, and duplicators. Punched card
tabulating systems had appeared in a few insurance firms by 1910, with significant implications for
their internal business methods. The life insurance industry was among the earliest commercial
users of this technology. In this early period, a few insurance firms used these systems to help deal
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with their growing information processing needs by speeding up various sorting, counting, and
adding processes. Yet even during this early period, the life insurance industry made known the
inadequacies of tabulating technology for its purposes, with insurance firms and associations
wielding their inventive resources and market power in ways that initiated on-going patterns of
interaction between the insurance industry and the tabulating industry.
The life insurance industry was one of the very first private industries to show interest in
Hollerith's system. That interest began with the Actuarial Society demonstration described at the
beginning of this paper. At that meeting the Prudential, which, with over one million insurance
policies,2 2 was second only to Metropolitan Life in number of policies handled, announced plans
to try the system. (The decision to try it was made easier by the fact that from the very start,
Hollerith and his successors always rented rather than sold equipment to commercial customers.)
Within a year Hollerith installed a tabulating system for the Prudential, presumably including the
slow sorting box which had not yet been replaced by a separate sorter.
The Prudential's actuary, John K. Gore, evidently found the sorting method a significant
drawback and was not willing to wait for Hollerith to address this problem. Surprisingly, he had
or could acquire in his own family the inventive and mechanical skills necessary to address it
himself. In 1895, Gore installed at Prudential a key-operated card punch and electro-mechanical
sorter of his own invention and his brother-in-law's construction.2 3 His sorting device (see Figure
4), which used a radial configuration quite different from Hollerith's contemporary or future
designs, sorted specially designed cards (different in size and shape from those used by Hollerith)
at a rate of 250 cards per minute, much faster than Hollerith's sorting box. His system lacked,
however, any form of tabulator, thus requiring some other manual or mechanized process for
counting cards or adding quantities. Apparently Gore felt that sorting was more important (or more
of a bottleneck) than counting in handling the firm's voluminous industrial insurance records.
Presumably Hollerith learned about Gore's device right away, since he had installed his
own equipment there in 1891, made several trips back to get it working, and, at some point,
removed it.2 4 He did not, however, immediately respond to this challenge. In the time leading up
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to the 1900 Census he developed an automatic card feeding system and the accumulating or adding
function for the tabulator, as well as a new, key-operated card punch, speeding up those two
aspects of the system. At this point, in Census tabulation (as well as in the manual punched card
sorting and counting systems used by many insurance companies), knitting needles passed through
holes in the cards were the most common sorting method, suggesting that the sorting boxes were
too slow and probably incompatible with the automatic card feeder. 2 5
By 1901, however, pressure had mounted on Hollerith, both from Census work and from
the insurance companies, to address this remaining bottleneck or reverse salient in the system.
Considerable correspondence between Hollerith and various insurance company actuaries and
executives in 1900 and 1901, both about their own firms' needs and about a multi-company
mortality study to be undertaken by the Actuarial Society of America (ASA) in 1902, demonstrates
that Hollerith was highly aware of this potential market and the shortcomings of his system for that
market. 2 6 In a 1901 letter from Gore to Hollerith concerning which system--Gore's or Hollerith's-
-would be adopted by the ASA for use in its mortality study, Gore stated his view of the
relationship between the two systems: "I have always had an idea that a combination of your
system and my own would produce maximum results as to speed. In sorting vast numbers of
cards, even including the counting, my system is much quicker than yours. When, however, by
sorting, the numbers of cards in the various groups are reduced to the hundreds your system is the
quicker."2 7 Of course, incompatibility of card shape and design precluded such a combination.
Unfortunately for Hollerith, his late-1901 introduction of an electro-mechanical sorter for his own
system2 8 came too late to gain him the contract for the Actuarial Society study. By then, the ASA
committee had decided to use Gore's machine for the 1902 mortality study, even though its smaller
card size required a reduction in the amount of data to be collected.29
Hollerith's new sorting device quickly became a key part of his system. It started out
sorting at 250 cards per minute, the same rate as the Gore sorter, and subsequent improvements
made it even faster.3 0 Soon the Gore sorter was clearly unable to keep up. The 1902 study was the
first and last multi-company insurance study to use Gore's system, and Gore apparently never
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considered marketing his device to other insurance firms. By the 1910s, the Prudential had begun
exploring alternatives to the Gore sorter, though the inertia of what is now referred to as an
"installed base," combined with one developmental dead end, 31 meant that it was not until the
1930s that the Prudential completely abandoned the Gore equipment in favor of an extensive IBM
set-up.3 2 While Gore's invention was soon outmoded, however, it should be viewed not just as a
technological curiosity; r. it was the first of several instances in which lead-user life insurance
firms with incentive to inn,. ,-ate put efforts into in-house development of punch-card technology to
better meet their needs than equipment available from external vendors (of which Hollerith was, at
this time, the only one), thereby exerting market pressure on the tabulating industry to respond to
the unmet needs.
In the final years of the nineteenth century and the opening decade of the twentieth century,
other insurance companies were also beginning to experiment with mechanized sorting and
tabulation. Initially these firms, like the Prudential, experienced the shortcomings of Hollerith's
early equipment for their purposes, though they did not typically follow the Prudential's path of in-
house invention. In the years preceding the turn of the century, several moderate-sized insurance
firms contracted with the service arm of Library Bureau, a library and office supply firm that was
licensed to use Hollerith equipment in providing services to firms, to undertake studies for them.3 3
In a 1901 letter to Hollerith, a Travellers Insurance Company actuary described his firm's 1896
experience--and problems--contracting with the Library. Bureau to compile one year's accident
statistics:
As I stated before, the original difficulty seemed to be that the sub-divisions of our cards
were so numerous that the time required to wire or set up a machine for the work was so
great as to take away all advantage gained in the rapid tabulation after it was once set up.3 4
At this point, any change in the columns to be counted or added required time-consuming rewiring.
But the experience was not entirely useless:
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We found, however, that the punch card served our purpose very much better than the
written card previously used. We have therefore since that time used your punches in
preparing the cards and have done our tabulating by means of knitting needles and
comptometers.... The results have been so satisfactory that we shall continue to use the
punch.
Apparently Travellers was not alone in this strategy, since Hollerith's correspondence with
representatives of insurance companies reveals that several expressed interest in the card punches
but not in other parts of the system.3 5 At this time, Hollerith's Census business interfered with his
ability to respond to these firms' needs and to work with them as he had done with the New York
Central Railroad: "I have at present appointments with several insurance actuaries, to which I have
not been able to give attention on account of my rush here in Washington." 3 6 This lack of time for
the life insurance industry was also clearly a factor in his failure to convince the ASA to use his
equipment in its 1902 mortality study.3 7
By 1905, having lost the U.S. Census business, at least for the present, Hollerith turned to
the commercial market in earnest. By the end of the first decade of the new century, evidence
suggests that both the equipment and insurance companies' perceptions of it had changed. The
sorter had been added to Hollerith's line and improvements were already being introduced to speed
it up. Moreover, a plugboard system had replaced the time-consuming rewiring system complained
of by the Travellers' actuary, speeding up changeovers. By 1910, a New York Life actuary,
apparently reflecting the view of many life insurance actuaries, noted that while Hollerith's system
had been around for 20 years, recently Hollerith had finally developed and adapted his machines to
a point that they were suitable for insurance use.3 8 By then, New York Life and many more
insurance companies were adopting Hollerith machinery, primarily for actuarial and occasionally
for broader insurance purposes.
In 1909 New York Life, which was then the second largest insurance firm in terms of
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value of insurance in force (but not in terms of number of policies in force, since it sold ordinary
but not industrial insurance), converted from a manual card system for mortality studies to a
Hollerith system.3 9 According to Arthur Hunter, the actuary who reported the change in the
Transactions of the Actuarial Society of America (TASA), the reasons for the conversion were
clear:
While there is considerable expense involved in making a change from written to punched
cards, the cost of installing the new system should be offset by the saving in clerk hire in
from three to five years. In addition to the saving in money the saving in time and facility
for making investigations in greater detail have induced many companies to look with favor
on the new system.40
The Hollerith equipment was viewed as speeding up existing processes for in-house mortality
investigations, allowing more extensive analysis in the same time period, and reducing labor costs.
In order to assure accuracy, New York Life adopted a system by which two 45-column cards were
independently punched for each policy, on different colors of card stock, then superimposed and
held up to the light to be visually checked for errors. While the extra card punching took time,
Hunter made a virtue out of necessity, arguing that "This constitutes one of the greatest advantages
of the perforated card over the written card" (p. 265), since it resulted in two complete sets of
cards, one of which could be kept in numerical order and one in mortality investigation order, thus
saving time in updating cards (the former set could be used as an index to the latter) and in
conducting further investigations as desired. Even with this duplication of effort, the system was
expected to save time and money.
Perhaps the clearest signal of the change in attitude towards Hollerith tabulators in the life
insurance industry was the adoption of Hollerith equipment for the 1910 Joint Medico-Actuarial
Mortality Study, a multi-company study similar to that of 1902. In describing how the Actuarial
Society was adapting New York Life's new Hollerith methods to the upcoming multi-company
study, Hunter noted that by this time, "the use of perforated cards is so well known that a lengthy
explanation is not necessary."4 1 While insurance firms submitted their data for the 1902 study
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written on tabular forms to be converted to punched form, many of them submitted data on
Hollerith punched cards in 1910. The Committee in charge of the 1910 study created a set of codes
for standard 45-column Hollerith cards, because "There were so many companies who desired to
use the Hollerith machines in supplying the data for the Committee." As in New York Life's
internal system, firms supplying data in card form would punch two sets of cards to check for
accuracy, but after verification would submit only one set to the Committee, retaining the other for
further study of their own statistics. This Medico-Actuarial study was significant both in revealing
the extent to which Hollerith tabulating equipment had become accepted in actuarial departments of
life insurance firms and in serving as the means for introducing the machinery into other firms or
segments of firms.4 2
By this time, Hollerith machines were also beginning to be used for broader insurance
purposes in a few firms. Henry N. Kaufman, an assistant actuary from Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of Hartford, a moderate-sized firm, described his firm's fairly complicated system
of Hollerith cards, which included a new business card (recording the details of new policies), a
deferred premium card (to "provide a method of obtaining the totals of the gross and net deferred
premiums"), and several other cards with specific purposes. 4 3 Each card was designed differently,
with appropriate labels printed over each set of columns and some with designated sections for
handwritten entries. The labelling and use of combination cards with handwritten and punched data
allowed the cards to be used to look up information on a specific card, just as the older, non-
punched records would have been used. Kaufman stated that each card must be punched in
duplicate for verification; like Hunter, he argued that duplicate typing was the most economical
way of ensuring accuracy and that it provided cards that could often be of use when kept in a
different order from the originals.
The actuarial mortality studies described previously used Hollerith equipment primarily to
sort large numbers of policy cards into categories and to count the number of cards in each
category; the resulting tally was then entered onto a tabular schedule by the machine operator.
Valuation of all policies in force for regulatory bodies, another actuarial application, involved
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summing only one field, the one with the monetary value of the insurance policy. More general
applications of Hollerith equipment to standard insurance processes such as that of Phoenix
Mutual, which held great potential for improving the efficiency of normal operations, but which
also involved a wider range of needs, exposed some of the weaknesses of the equipment of that
era. For example, several of the cards had different or additional fields with quantities that needed
to be summed (e.g., loan amounts as well as policy value). The tabulating device "must be ordered
especially to meet the requirements of each particular office" and "It is necessary therefore to
carefully ascertain in advance what fields are desired to be added, because when once such fields
are established they cannot be changed." 4 4 Thus the tabulating machines themselves were not
very flexible at this stage. (Within two years, an exchange of memoranda within the Tabulating
Machine Company reveals, it became clear to the makers of Hollerith equipment that it was
desirable to build in flexibility by having all equipment configured to allow accumulation on any
column. 4 5)
Card capacity was also a constraint. As Kaufman explained, "It is necessary of course to
have a number of different cards, as all the information cannot be punched on one card; and
furthermore, it will facilitate matters if one card is not used for too many purposes, especially as
the punching of the cards is a very small matter."4 6 Moreover, the cards used in the system
described by Kaufman, like those used in actuarial studies, for the most part simply translated non-
punched-card records to punched cards, and in some cases even created new, intermediate steps
not necessary before.
Perhaps most significantly, these broader uses highlighted the lack of any printing
capability in the system. During the period up to 1910, tabulating technology functioned essentially
as a large and fast sorting, counting, and adding machine in the life insurance industry. An
operator had to stand by the tabulator to record the number displayed on the dial each time it
reached a total, another opportunity for inefficiency and inaccuracy. Any use that involved
recording some quantity from each card, rather than just counting or aggregating large groups of
cards, received only limited aid from the Hollerith equipment of this era. By contrast, adding and
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calculating machines of this period, although they could not sort, could list as well as add items,
thus allowing visual verification for accuracy. Bookkeeping machines used with pre-printed forms
created permanent records as they listed, added, and subtracted. Clearly, insurance companies
would be able to use the tabulating equipment for more and different types of processes if it had
printing capability to list information it read from cards and to print totals.
In this first period, then, the insurance industry, as represented by the Actuarial Society and
by individual firms, recognized both the potential and the shortcomings of Hollerith's technology
for facilitating information handling. Early in the relationship, the insurance industry made its
desires known through several mechanisms: the Prudential's invention of an alternative sorting
technology in-house, the Actuarial Society's choice of Gore's over Hollerith's equipment for the
multi-company mortality study of 1902, and the correspondence of actuaries from various
companies with Hollerith. By 1910, Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Company (TMC), at this point
still the sole provider of such equipment to commercial customers, had broadened its insurance
market by responding to some of the industry's initial needs. The 1911 annual report of TMC
listed the largest three ordinary insurance companies as well as several smaller firms as customers.
Nevertheless, it had yet to win the business of the two largest industrial insurance firms. Prudential
still used its Gore machines, while Metropolitan Life, which had tried out Hollerith machines
during its participation in the 1910 Medico-Actuarial Mortality Investigation, found them useful for
this work, but "not applicable to the general work of the [Actuarial] division," work for which they
continued to use hand-sorted cards or bound registers. 4 7 Yet TMC was still a small, inventor-
dominated firm struggling with product development, a firm that had not yet established the solid
base of production, management, and marketing capabilities necessary, according to Chandler, to
establish a real first-mover advantage in its new industry.48 Indeed, marketing still seemed
secondary at this stage, since the early publicity Hollerith received combined with the great need
for better methods of handling large quantities of data and TMC's weaknesses in manufacturing
and management had created a backlog of unfilled orders in 1907 that was not eliminated until
1909.49
15
The still-significant shortcomings of the technology for insurance purposes needed to be
addressed before broader insurance use would become common. The next phase of the relationship
between insurance firms and the tabulating industry centered on the tabulating industry's
development of printing capability, on the one hand, and insurance firms' initial attempts to
integrate tabulating data with creating internal documents needed for operations, on the other.
The Push Toward Printing
In 1911, Hollerith's TMC joined in a merger of four makers of business machinery for
measurement and information handling; thus it became a component (within a few years, the
central component) of the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company (C-T-R), and Hollerith's
own role became that of advisor. In 1914 Thomas J. Watson took over as general manager (soon
to become president) of C-T-R, and in 1924 would change the firm's name to IBM. Under his
leadership the firm began to invest in marketing as well as production and management.
Development of tabulator technology, however, was still critical to expanding and dominating the
market for tabulating equipment, and the next major stage of tabulator development, the addition of
printing capability, came not from Hollerith and his successors, but from newly emerging external
competition. The life insurance industry encouraged the push towards printing by supporting
Hollerith's two competitors: J. Royden Peirce and James Powers. Almost a decade later, when
Peirce had demonstrated that his talents were in invention, not in development or production, C-T-
R would hire Peirce and buy his patents to use against Powers' Accounting Machine Company;
that firm, which became a division of Remington Rand in 1927, would remain C-T-R's only real
challenger for the life insurance business and the market as a whole. 50 In the 1910s, the life
insurance industry encouraged the development of printing capability in tabulating equipment
through both Peirce and Powers.
J. Royden Peirce was an inventor who designed a few innovative, customized sets of
punched-card equipment for life insurance companies. He apparently first came to Hollerith's
attention as a potential competitive threat in 1912, when a report on Peirce's machinery to the
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President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency (PCEE) and a prospectus for a Peirce
company were forwarded to Hollerith.5 1 According to the prospectus, Peirce Patents Company
had been formed to manufacture his "entirely new system of perforated cards in conjunction with
automatic selective machinery and adding machinery." The PCEE report noted that the adding
machine portion of this system (based on expired adding machine patents) accumulated totals,
then, in a subsequent step, printed them out by categories on a paper tape. In this system, the
device for perforating the cards also typed at the top of the card the numbers corresponding to the
punched holes, making it easy for a person (as well as the other machines in the system) to read the
card.
This 1912 report did not suggest that Peirce was working with life insurance firms at that
time, and other evidence makes it clear that he was, in fact, working with electric utilities to
develop punch-card equipment specialized to that industry's needs.5 2 By 1914, however,
insurance company interest in his devices had focused much of his attention on the life insurance
industry. In that year, a paper presented at the Actuarial Society of America described a Peirce
installation being used by Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, a moderately large company
that had shown early interest in the Hollerith tabulator.5 3 By then, Peirce was also under contract
to develop an installation for the largest U.S. insurance firm in terms of both value of insurance in
force and number of policies, Metropolitan Life, which retained Peirce "to adapt his devices to the
special requirements of the Actuarial Division. "5 4
By 1914, Hollerith's successors were also aware of the threat from Peirce. Gershom
Smith, then general manager of TMC (still a separate operating company within C-T-R, though it
would soon become a division of C-T-R), warned newcomer Watson of the insurance industry's
defection, writing that "there seems considerable to be feared from [the] Royden Peirce machine in
connection with life insurance companies and the Powers Printing Tabulator in connection with
other insurance companies." 5 5 He proceeded to cite rental fees and card sales for this segment of
the market, which added up to almost $140,000 a year, nearly 15% of TMC's total 1913 revenues
of roughly $950,000.56
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III
The 1914 description of Mutual Benefit's Peirce system5 7 suggests the directions of
development being supported by the life insurance industry at this early stage. The Peirce system
used only four possible hole positions, of which one, two, or three were punched in specified
combinations to indicate the numbers from one through nine (see Figure 5). This system allowed
two rows of coding per card, thus potentially doubling the capacity of a Hollerith card (although
Mutual Benefit chose to increase the amount of punched data only slightly, to 50 columns, while
using the remaining space for additional handwritten data). Another advantage of the Peirce
machinery was that the punching machines simultaneously punched the desired hole(s) in a column
and typed the corresponding number along the top of the card, thus promoting more accurate
punching and allowing users of the cards to read the figures punched. Most importantly, the
custom-made tabulator could print out or list on plain paper or forms the designated data from each
card, providing printed totals as needed. This printing feature was cited by the Metropolitan as the
major innovation to be realized in the Peirce system it was having built:
The tabulating machine tabulates the number of policies, amount of insurance, annual
premium, premium payable,--either annually, semi-annually or quarterly,--and deferred
premium, according to the various subdivisions into which they are sorted; prints the detail
of the classifications, as well as the totals, all the while recording restorations in red ink and
cancellations in black ink. When the cards for one group are tabulated, the machine records
the totals before proceeding to tabulate the next group.58
The promised ability to list details from each card as it passed through the tabulator (a capability
apparently added to Peirce's system after 1912) and to print out totals and subtotals as it went,
rather than having the machine stop after each set of cards and wait for operators to copy down the
numbers in the registers, would obviously improve efficiency and remove an opportunity for
human error in transcription of totals. It would also allow many internal reports (e.g., lists of
policy numbers and policy amounts by location, with total amounts in each category), to be created
directly from cards (Figure 6).
Peirce's strengths were more in conceptualizing than in building machinery, and this
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system, ordered in June of 1913 to be delivered within six to nine months, was still not even
approaching completion sixteen months later.5 9 The promised equipment was apparently
completed in 1916, with its key device, the listing-adding machine, costing double the price
originally set.6 0 While the final product of this first Peirce contract never lived up to all of Peirce's
claims, it must have performed well enough to seem highly promising in comparison to the non-
printing Hollerith machines of this period. In early 1918 Metropolitan Life's Vice President wrote
to the head of the British Prudential Assurance Company, "Our experience convinces us that the
Peirce machines are so superior to the Powers and Hollerith machines that they will eventually
supplant both the latter, though now we are using all three." 6 1 Like the Prudential's earlier
investment in Gore's development, Metropolitan Life's investment in Peirce's on-site development
reflected the strong incentive of a lead user to innovate. The fact that they continued to use a few
Hollerith and Powers machines as well suggests a pragmatic desire to benefit from commercial
equipment as they waited, without getting too heavily invested in either available system.
Moreover, around this time, the Prudential also contracted with Peirce for a successor to the Gore
sorters. 6 2 In retrospect it is clear that Peirce, who lacked the business ability to develop his
inventions, was never a serious challenger to C-T-R's insurance market; nevertheless, at this time
and into the next phase of the relationship between insurance users and the tabulating industry, he
continued to divert some life insurance business from C-T-R and to require attention from
Hollerith's successors.6 3
James Powers posed a more serious threat to the Hollerith machine's market as a whole
and to its insurance market, specifically. Powers was essentially put in business by the U.S.
Census Bureau, which hired him as an alternative to Hollerith.6 4 By 1911 he had formed his own
firm, Powers Accounting Machine Corporation, which eventually became a division of
Remington-Rand. The Powers Printing Tabulator (Figure 7), cited as a threat to the insurance
market in Gershom Smith's 1914 letter, used cards compatible with those used in Hollerith
equipment (since it was developed within the Census Department, at a time when some Hollerith
equipment was also still in use) but sensed the holes purely mechanically rather than electrically. 6 5
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Like the promised Peirce machine, it could list selected data from each card run through it and print
totals.6 6 When used with appropriately designed forms, it could generate usable records and
reports directly from the cards. For example, cards could be sorted by district and then agent, and,
with pre-printed forms in the printing section of the tabulator, could be used to create lists of all the
policies serviced by a specific agent.6 7 Previously such a listing would have been prepared by
hand or typewriter from the sorted cards. While the Powers Printing Tabulator did not offer all of
the advantages promised by Peirce, the machines existed in working models by 1913 and were
readily available for rental by commercial customers by 1915, unlike the Peirce machines, which
were forever promised but always delayed. 6 8 A few medium-size life insurance firms, such as the
Travellers Insurance Company and the Phoenix Insurance Company, quickly adopted Powers
equipment to gain printing capability.6 9 The card compatibility and rental basis of the business
made this switch easy for them.
While the largest American life insurance firms were initially more interested in the Peirce
equipment, the largest British life insurance company, the venerable Prudential Assurance
Company, was showing great interest in the Powers printing tabulator. Like the rest of the British
insurance industry, the Prudential had dragged its heels in introducing office technology of any
sort; by the second decade of the century, however, it showed interest in punched-card
tabulating.7 0 The 1911 Approved Societies Act had legislated a health insurance system for the
working class in England, and the industrial assurance companies were asked to administer it.
Prudential actuary Joseph Burn decided to use this new project, which was entirely independent of
the Prudential's regular insurance business, as an opportunity to test the new technology. He set
up a battery of Powers machines to handle this project.
Burn was so enthusiastic about the results that by 1917 he wrote to his firm's American
counterpart, Metropolitan Life, noting that the Powers machines, although they needed many
further improvements, "are much better than Hollerith" machines and suggesting that Metropolitan
Life join Prudential in an attempt to "control and if possible manufacture" the Powers machine or
some other alternative to the Hollerith machine, such as the Peirce, in order to insure their own
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supplies at reasonable prices while also making a good investment. 7 1 Metropolitan Life showed no
interest in this proposal; its executive stated that the Peirce equipment was superior to that of both
Hollerith and Powers, as noted above, and that Metropolitan Life preferred to remain the sole
beneficiary of Peirce's development efforts sponsored by the company. Meanwhile, the Prudential
proceeded to assure its supply and to give itself some influence over further developments (as the
next section will demonstrate) by buying the British Powers agency in 1919.72
C-T-R's failure to win the two largest American industrial insurance companies
(Metropolitan Life and the Prudential) and its British affiliate's failure to win the largest British
industrial insurance company (Prudential), along with defections among smaller insurance
companies and other businesses, such as public utilities, 7 3 clearly threatened its business. At a
time when C-T-R under Thomas Watson. was investing in marketing, management, and
manufacturing facilities to a much greater extent than Powers, C-T-R was still struggling with a
challenge from the financially weaker but technically superior (in capabilities offered, though not in
reliability) Powers. Shortly after recognizing the dual threat posed by Powers and Peirce, Watson
had established an 'experimental' or research and development department to enable C-T-R to
better respond to technical challenges.7 4 Drawing on the capabilities of this new experimental
department, in 1917 C-T-R introduced an innovation in key punching that benefitted life insurance
companies: the verifier.7 5 This device allowed the firms to check the accuracy of punched cards
using a second operator, but without producing a second set of cards and without requiring manual
comparison of the two cards by holding them up to the light. The new process saved time and
cards, though at the sacrifice of the extra set of cards some companies had seen as advantages in
the earlier period. While the verifier gave-the Hollerith line an advantage on one dimension, it
clearly was not enough to offset the advantage of the printing tabulator.7 6 Only C-T-R's
introduction of a printing tabulator of its own at the beginning of the 1920s prevented continued
erosion of its life insurance business.7 7
When it finally became available, C-T-R's printing tabulator added another useful patented
feature: automatic control. 7 8 The device that provided this control determined when a designated
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field changed value and triggered the tabulator to provide a total; it rendered unnecessary the stop
cards previously manually inserted to stop the tabulation. In an early 1920s comparison of
Hollerith and Powers printing tabulators for use in handling actuarial work for Metropolitan Life's
industrial insurance (although that firm continued to work with Peirce, as the next section will
show, it also rented some equipment from the two commercial vendors), the analyst noted that
"We use the Hollerith Printer Tabulator machines exclusively for all Classification work, the
reason for this is, that 'Stop', 'Space' and 'Total' cards are not required in the Hollerith
Tabulators." 7 9 Not only did this feature save time, the report pointed out, but it improved
accuracy, since on tabulators without automatic control, "If the 'Space' card is not in place, the
machine will total, but the wrong total will be produced." The combination of automatic control
with printing capability, as well as the greater reliability of Hollerith equipment, moved some life
insurance firms from Powers back to Hollerith equipment. Both Phoenix and the Travellers had
switched to Hollerith equipment by 1924, and the actuary of the Travellers noted, "'We did use
Powers tabulating machines, until the Hollerith Automatic Control Printer came out, after which
we shifted principally to that."' 8 0 Again, the switch was eased by compatible cards and the fact
that the equipment was rented.
The author of a paper presented at the Life Office Management Association (LOMA; an
industry association that facilitated the sharing of information on methods and technologies used in
managing life insurance firms) around 1926 summarized the impact of printing capability on
insurance practices as follows:
Because the original Hollerith tabulator was a non-listing machine, the punched
cards were seldom used for direct preparation of records and their use was more or less
limited to the various analysis work.
This condition was changed when the Powers, and a few years later the Hollerith
printing tabulator, made their appearance on the market. These tabulators opened a new
field for the use of punch cards.
The practice of tabulating original records directly from punch cards is gradually
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becoming more common and is taking the place of former analysis of records after they
were made by hand.8 1
Thus the printing tabulator made insurance processes more efficient (as well as more accurate) by
allowing firms to eliminate steps from the old manual methods and, with the aid of pre-printed
forms that identified the numbers printed in specified locations, to create reports and records
directly from cards. Still, the printing tabulator only sorted, tabulated, and printed numbers, thus
limiting the types of documents it could create. This limitation would soon be addressed.
Acquiring Alphabetical Capabilities
The next key phase in the relationship between tabulating technology and the life insurance
industry was the evolution of alphabetical capabilities in the mid-1920s. Alphabetical tabulating
allowed names as well as numbers to be printed, thus providing more useful listings and reports
for internal use and opening the way for the direct generation of policyholder documents from
punched cards. As in the case of printing capability, the life insurance industry did not wait
passively until C-T-R brought this innovation to market; rather, it encouraged the development in a
variety of ways, once again working through C-T-R's rivals in the tabulator business, Peirce and
Powers. This was to be the last major challenge to C-T-R's (soon IBM's) domination of the
American tabulator market.
A brief look at some common types of internal and external documents requiring
alphabetical information and how they were generated in the first two decades of the century
demonstrates why insurance firms sought alphabetical capability. The weekly payments of
industrial insurance were collected by agents who went door to door, based on manually created
and updated bound registers and frequently retyped lists by policy-holder name of all active
policies in an agent's assigned area or debit. The yearly or quarterly premiums of ordinary
insurance, and the monthly premiums of a growing category of intermediate insurance required
sending out first a notice of premium due and then a receipt for payments rendered. Such external
documents required names and addresses, as well as numerical information such as the amount of
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the premium and the value of the policy. This addressing was accomplished by typewriter until the
second decade of the twentieth century, when most life insurance firms adopted addressing
machines such as the Addressograph. 8 2 Addressing machines used embossed metal plates or fiber
stencils to record and print information used repeatedly. Such devices avoided repeated manual
typing of the same information (which introduced multiple chances for error) and allowed rapid
processing of notices. Still, a plate had to be created for each policy holder and the bulky sets of
plates had to be maintained, updated when policyholders moved or changed their policies, sorted,
and kept consistent with the punched cards used for other purposes, requiring a significant staff
and introducing some (if fewer than the old system) opportunities for error. Creating both debit
lists for internal use and premium notices and receipts for external use directly from punched cards
would certainly reduce transcription errors and potentially simplify and speed up insurance
business processes.
As early as 1913, well before Powers or Hollerith and his successors are known to have
expressed interest in this idea, Peirce seems to have envisioned an alphabetical tabulator for
producing policyholder documents. Confidential drawings for Metropolitan Life, many dated as
early as May 20, 1913, show Peirce's vision of a system that would use punched holes to encode
the name and address of the insured, along with the relevant numerical information (Figure 8).83
By 1916 Peirce had submitted to Metropolitan Life a formal proposal to construct a set of
customized punched-card machinery designed to prepare and address premium notices, receipts,
and stubs that would be mailed to policyholders and to prepare various internal records, including a
register of policies issued and an agent's list of notices.8 4 The perforating machine, which
resembled a typewriter (Figure 9), was to punch numbers and letters onto cards, while
simultaneously typing the corresponding letters and numbers along the top of the card. The
promised system also included a listing machine and a machine for duplicating certain information
needed by the Actuarial Department onto another card. Peirce's proposal laid out his vision for
transforming the Metropolitan's document creation processes through this system:
By means of these machines all hand work in connection with the recording, notice
24
sending and preparation of data for the Actuary's Office is entirely done away with. [...]
I would point out, finally, what a great step in advance of anything which has
heretofore been done in this line, these perforated card machines are. Once the primary card
has been made[,] all the reports and notices from the beginning of the policy's career to its
end will be made by machinery. From the production of the card to the final reports in the
Actuarial Division is one continuous automatic mechanical cycle.
By 1918, when this proposal had been converted into a contract, the plans had become
even more ambitious, including sixteen different, customized devices, all variations on the
machines described in the original proposal. The names of just a few indicate how the proposed
system had been expanded and specialized: notice and receipt machine, audit report tabulator,
commission tabulator, state report tabulator. It is unclear whether this increased specialization was
driven primarily by Peirce, by Metropolitan Life, or by the interaction of both. Around that time,
Peirce also entered into two other major contracts for alphabetical punch-card systems for life
insurance, one with the Insurance Division of the United States Veterans Bureau and one with the
(American) Prudential Insurance Company. 8 5 In fact, in 1919 Peirce approached Metropolitan Life
with a proposal to renegotiate its contract to share the development costs and the resulting
developments with these two and potentially more organizations. As it had done with the British
Prudential's proposal, however, Metropolitan Life turned down the opportunity, preferring to bear
all of the costs and all of the rewards of Peirce's customized developments by itself.
In the mid-1920s, some members of Metropolitan Life's Home Office Study Committee
challenged the firm's strategy with regard to Peirce, initiating studies with Powers and Hollerith
equipment and pointing out the endless delays as well as many disadvantages Peirce's nonstandard
and highly customized equipment, even if finally delivered, would have for the firm.8 6 In
particular, they noted its inflexibility to any changes in insurance products or in the nature of the
data and documents needed. In response to the anti-Peirce faction's observation that Powers
equipment could be made to serve the firm's needs with only minor modifications, Actuary J.D.
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Craig, one of Peirce's supporters in the firm, revealed an ideological motive for the long pursuit of
the chimerical Peirce system:
Our fundamental proposition is that the Metropolitan is big enough, and its work important
enough, so that we do not have to fit our system to existing machines; that time is not
imperative; that the Metropolitan, rather than propose a plan to fit existing machines, can
demand that machines be built to fit its system. 8 7
This ideological component to the debate may help explain why support for Peirce continued so
long. Metropolitan Life continued to hold Peirce to his contracts and to renew these contracts, until
at least 1926.
Peirce's vision of a system fully integrating all stages of information handling and
document production was ahead of his mechanical and business abilities, and none of the three
contracts he made for insurance tabulating systems was to be satisfactorily completed nor the
machinery put into complete operation. In fact, a thorough "Study of the Peirce Machines"
conducted by the Metropolitan in 1926, after the firm had paid over $1 million for Peirce's
development efforts, makes the following assessment:
In reviewing the other installations of Peirce machines one is impressed with the
fact that in every case the installation has been practically a development and that a great
deal of time has been consumed before machines have been delivered. On delivery
considerable time has elapsed before the equipment is ready to use. In no one instance has
there been a complete installation of equipment.8 8
Thus these attempts by Metropolitan Life and the Prudential to fund customized development by
Peirce, while consistent, at least initially, with the incentives for a lead user, were not very
successful.
Meanwhile, the Powers camp was again taking the lead from C-T-R in the practical
realization of a simpler and more flexible version of alphabetical tabulating than the highly
customized and integrated installations envisioned by Peirce. Beginning in 1915, even before it
bought the British rights to produce and market Powers machines, the British Prudential Assurance
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had started working with the British Powers agency, the Accounting and Tabulating Machine
Company (or 'Acc and Tab,' as it was known) to develop an alphabetical tabulator. 8 9 The impetus
for this undertaking came from the Prudential manager in charge of its Powers machine
installation, who saw how valuable this capability could be for the insurance company. A mid-
1930s retrospective Prudential account stated its goal as follows: "This development came about by
the express desire of the Prudential Assurance Company, in order that the name of the assured
might be printed mechanically in the Industrial Branch records." 9 0 The Prudential initially
sponsored and, after buying the Powers agency in Britain, funded and oversaw most of the
development, by 1920, of an alphabetical attachment to the regular Powers tabulator. 9 1 According
to Campbell-Kelly, Prudential actuary Burn had a comprehensive and ambitious vision of
reconfiguring his own company's processes around tabulating equipment:
Joseph Burn saw this development as one which was crucial to his long-term plans to
decentralize and reduce the cost of insurance policy administration. It would be a costly
development, but one with vast potential for the Prudential business, allowing the complete
accounting operation to be done by one system, and thus enabling them to dispense with
their batteries of Addressograph and bookkeeping machines.9 2
Dispensing with the Addressograph machines was still decades away, since both greater
card capacity and the ability to print material from a single card onto multiple lines were still needed
to allow the printing of addresses. Yet by 1923, the Prudential was using this system to generate
various lists and registers demanded in its industrial insurance business (Figure 10). 9 3 Since at
this time the firm had 24 million industrial policies (as compared to 1 million ordinary policies),
this use had vast potential for savings, helping to reduce the always troublesome expense ratio of
industrial insurance.
Interestingly, Prudential did not follow Metropolitan Life's policy of attempting to retain all
costs and benefits of development itself. As Campbell-Kelly explains it, "Since it was unlikely that
Powers would undertake this development of its own volition, the plan was for the Prudential to
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do the development, and recoup the cost by supplying machines to other insurance companies."9 4
The Prudential did not view this purchase as a mechanism for acquiring competitive advantage over
other British insurance firms; in fact, Burn actively helped the Acc and Tab market the equipment
to other insurance companies. Until after World War II, the Acc and Tab continued to function as a
well-funded subsidiary of the Prudential with royalty agreements with Powers in the U.S., a
situation that allowed it to avoid the financial crises that weakened the latter firm and to compete on
much more even terms with the British Hollerith agency than Powers did with C-T-R.
After the Prudential sponsored the development of alphabetical capabilities in the British
Powers affiliate, Metropolitan Life began to add its weight to similar developments in Powers,
although the exact sequence of events is now obscure. Sometime before the beginning of 1924
AMC had apparently developed a machine with limited alphabetical capability, allowing only 13 of
the 26 letters to be used.9 5 It could not, however, have printed policyholder names with so few
letters. In late 1923, a committee of Metropolitan Life executives had visited the British
Prudential's offices and seen their full-alphabet tabulators, which they noted as first of "the more
important additions and improvements that have been made by the British Powers Company" and
clearly superior to the 13-letter tabulators of the American Powers organization. 9 6 Their report also
outlined in great detail Prudential's application of this machinery in its industrial insurance
operations. At this time, although Peirce continued to work for Metropolitan Life on contract,
Metropolitan Life's Home Office Study Committee had also begun working with Powers and IBM
to develop ways of modifying their equipment to mechanize more of the insurance firm's operating
processes.9 7 For these developmental efforts, however, Metropolitan Life provided very little
monetary support, since the two vendors were competing to acquire all of this huge firm's
business.
One intermediate outcome of this effort is commemorated in a framed sample listing--
including names as well as numerical information--of Metropolitan Life industrial insurance
policies, shown in Figure 11.98 This document claims to be a "Sheet Run on the First Alphabetic
Tabulator in the United States," which was "Constructed by the Powers Accounting Machine
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Company for the Home Office Study Committee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company,"Text on the commemorative listing makes clear the potential application the Committee
had in mind: "The machine will now produce life and lapse register sheets from punched cards
showing all the details necessary for Home Office and District Office purposes as well as subtotals
for each class of transaction and a grand total for the week's business." In the process of working
with Powers AMC in developing this alphabetical tabulator, according to the Committee's logs,
one Metropolitan Life employee devised several mechanical changes to the equipment that the
insurance firm wanted to patent, to "furnish us protection against undue charges for the Powers
machines, should we come to a final arrangement." 9 9 This protection was never to be needed as
Metropolitan Life ultimately followed a different path. Nevertheless, this sequence of interactions
indicates that the largest American life insurance firm had begun to shift away from its early and
expensive strategy of solely funding Peirce's developments and was now also working closely
with the more viable Powers organization and even, Home Office Study Committee logs reveal,
with IBM itself in its attempt to acquire the technological improvements it wanted for handling its
voluminous industrial insurance business.
How, then, was C-T-R (which became IBM in 1924) responding to the alphabetical
tabulator challenge from Powers, so soon after it had finally introduced its first numerical printing
tabulator? In 1922, as an initial step towards addressing this threat, C-T-R bought Peirce's main
engineering shop (though not the shop he had set up within Metropolitan Life for his contract
work) and the rights to his patents, including some alphabetical patents, and hired Peirce himself to
help the firm develop its own alphabetical tabulating machine.10 0 The essential incompatibility of
Peirce's system with the Hollerith machinery, along with Peirce's continued work on contract for
Metropolitan Life, may help account for the long lag before IBM introduced its own alphabetical
tabulator in 1931.101 Meanwhile, however, in the late 1920s IBM addressed another drawback of
tabulating equipment for insurance work (as well as for some other uses), a limitation that would
be exacerbated by alphabetical capability: card capacity. Encoding a name required a field of about
15 to 18 of the 45 columns on a standard card of the era, restricting the number of columns
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available for numerical fields and often requiring multiple cards for even the most basic data on a
single policy. In 1928 IBM introduced the 80-column card that remained its standard into the early
computer era (Figure 12).102 This new card, when used in conjunction with the alphabetical
tabulator IBM introduced three years later, had room for a substantial alphabetical field as well as
the numerical fields. Moreover, IBM's machinery could be modified to use both the new 80-
column cards and the old 45-column cards, thus offering a new advantage without making the
insurance firms' existing cards obsolete. 103 Interestingly, the slotted holes of the IBM 80-column
card were patented and also could not be used with the mechanical hole-sensing system of the
Powers tabulators; thus, in order to compete, Remington Rand introduced a 90-column card that
used a method of compression similar to that used in the original Peirce equipment (two rows of
short columns per card, with multiple holes in the same column punched to represent
characters). 10 4 These changes ended the compatibility between the two vendors that had allowed
easy switching.
Once again, IBM overcame a Powers technical advantage with a delayed but superior
product. While Powers had mounted a serious technical challenge, it lacked the solid financial
footing necessary to overcome IBM's advantages in the other capabilities. For example, in a
meeting between the president of Powers and the head of Metropolitan Life's Home Office Study
Committee to discuss their joint development efforts, the former noted that his firm's financial
problems limited the extent of its experimentation without compensation. 10 5 This financial
weakness in Powers was almost certainly a factor in AMC's failure to overtake IBM's first mover
advantage, in spite of Powers' technological lead in the mid-1920s. In 1927, Powers merged with
several other office machine companies into Remington Rand, shoring up its financial situation;
however, it was never the central component of that larger firm as TMC had been in C-T-R.
IBM had responded to the pressure of the life insurance industry (and of others such as
utilities and accounting applications cutting across industries) towards printing and alphabetical
capacity, and many American life insurance firms seem to have standardized on IBM equipment by
the early 1930s (e.g., the Equitable, Travellers Insurance Company, Phoenix Insurance Company,
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the Prudential). This shift in momentum towards IBM was not restricted to the life insurance
industry; by the 1930s IBM had established an eight-to-one advantage over Remington Rand's
Powers Division in the tabulating market. 10 6 By 1940, even the Metropolitan had fully abandoned
its experimentation with Peirce and Powers equipment, and introduced a large, 300-piece IBM
installation. 10 7
Peirce's overly ambitious vision of an integrated tabulating system to handle all tasks from
initial creation of cards through final documents remained out of reach. Nevertheless, by the end of
the tabulator era specific tasks such as premium billing had been automated in some companies.
Responding to customer needs, IBM and Remington Rand continued to introduce technical
improvements to facilitate such tasks: in 1929, Remington Rand introduced an attachment allowing
the use of continuous forms; in 1934, IBM introduced its automatic carriage, allowing continuous
multi-part carbon paper forms; in 1935, it introduced "Machines designed for issuing utility bills to
customers or premium notices to insurance policyholders," although these apparently required
multiple cards to produce multiple-line addresses; in 1941, it introduced a tabulator that allowed
three-line addressing from a single card; in 1948 it introduced high speed machines with a tape-
controlled automatic carriage for more flexible use of forms.10 8 Life insurance companies
gradually reconfigured their processes to take advantage of the capabilities they had sought. In a
1938 LOMA study of how member life insurance companies were handling premium billing
routines for ordinary insurance, only 2 out of the 95 companies making up the stratified sample
were using the tabulator to imprint "identifying data" onto forms, while 79 used Addressographs
and 14 used typewriters. 10 9 By the early 1950s, the LOMA publications were describing an
increasing number of such applications. 110
Conclusion
As a large and highly information-intensive industry, life insurance was one of the major
commercial industries using tabulating technology in the first half of the twentieth century."' But
the insurance industry was not simply a passive, if eager, recipient of this technology. Its leading
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firms and its industry organizations played an active role in encouraging technical and market
developments they saw as desirable. Beginning with Gore's design and development of his own
sorting machine in the 1890s, the industry--especially the largest industrial life insurance firms
with the greatest need for aid in handling ever-growing amounts of information--used its leverage
to encourage certain types of developments in the technology. These developments in turn allowed
firms to use tabulating systems in an increasing number of ways.
In the early years of tabulator development, the industry was most interested in the rapid
and multi-dimensional sorting of data required for actuarial work. Specific firms exerted pressure
towards this end via Gore's construction of an alternative sorting device for the Prudential as well
as the complaints of firms such as the Travellers, which had contracted for Library Bureau
Hollerith services. The industry as a whole communicated its needs to Hollerith through the
Actuarial Society's correspondence with him and its ultimate choice of the Gore sorter for the 1902
multi-company mortality study. It signalled approval for his subsequent developments by changing
its policy and adopting Hollerith technology for the 1910 study, thereby providing many of the
society's members with their first substantive exposure to the technology. The influence of the life
insurance industry, among other early user industries, helped shape the configuration of the
tabulating equipment Hollerith developed for the commercial market after he lost the census
market.
In the decades following 1910, the life insurance industry exerted its influence towards a
new goal. While tabulating continued to be important to actuarial calculations, its potential uses in
many other phases of the business soon became evident, making new capabilities desirable. With
the industry's heavy dependence on documents--both internal records such as agents' lists and
external transactional documents such as policyholder bills and receipts--it supported and
encouraged developments that broadened the uses of tabulating to integrate data manipulation with
document production, including first the printing tabulator and later the alphabetical tabulator.
Many companies (e.g. Travellers, Phoenix, and Mutual Benefit) made their needs known by
straightforward market choices, adopting the first printing tabulators developed by Powers and
32
11
Peirce, and returning to the Hollerith/IBM fold when it introduced its own printing tabulator,
which offered additional features and better reliability. Metropolitan Life and the American and
British Prudentials--the largest insurance companies on each side of the Atlantic, by both number
and value of policies--deliberately invested in innovation in tabulating technology. As lead users, in
Von Hippel's terminology, these three firms had the greatest incentives to seek more efficient and
accurate ways of handling the data and document processing associated with the increasing number
of policies. The British Prudential bought the British Powers agency, giving it direct influence over
the evolution of the technology as well as protecting the firm from exorbitant prices or restricted
supply brought on by the Acc and Tab's relationship to Powers in America. 1 12 Metropolitan Life
initially contracted with Peirce to develop customized proprietary technology to support its
processes, then, as delays mounted, it sought competitive developments from Powers and IBM, as
well. The American Prudential also contracted with Peirce for custom equipment.
While all of these mechanisms encouraged the evolution of printing capabilities, different
approaches had different effects on the specific life insurance firms adopting them. The British
Prudential's approach of buying and working with the British Powers organization (the Acc and
Tab) while allowing it to continue competing in the British market seems to have been a reasonably
successful intervention from Prudential's point of view. Rather than trying to gain competitive
advantage in the British insurance market through the exclusive use of this technology, Burn
helped market it to his colleagues in competing firms, preaching the importance of modern office
technology. His investment seems to have been successful financially and strategically, for the Acc
and Tab and for the Prudential, which only sold this subsidiary when Burn retired after World War
II.113
The attempts to develop proprietary technology for exclusive use of the developer had less
successful results. Gore's development of his sorter for the American Prudential initially gave that
firm a headstart in mechanized information processing, but later functioned to lock it into an
incompatible system as the commercial vendors improved the capabilities of tabulating technology
far beyond those offered by the Gore machine. That firm's contract with Peirce in 1918 indicates
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that by that time it recognized the need to acquire new equipment, but its decision to contract for
Peirce's custom-developed equipment was an unfortunate variation on its previous mistake. That
contract, which was never completed, delayed its ultimate adoption of modern tabulating
equipment on a large scale until almost 1940. Metropolitan Life had similar problems with Peirce,
investing a great deal of money and time for a highly customized but inflexible proprietary system
that was never successfully completed. In her study of the British capital equipment industry,
MacLeod found that "For the individual user-firm, exclusive reliance on the inventions of its own
machine shop was a high-risk strategy .. ..if pursued dogmatically, it could lead to expensive
mistakes, technological dead-ends, inefficient and even obsolete machinery." 1 14 Such a strategy
was inherently even more risky when the user firm was innovating (or overseeing innovation) in
an area requiring fundamentally different skills, as was the case with life insurance firms
innovating in machine technology. Furthermore, Metropolitan Life's ideological predisposition
towards special-purpose machines designed around its processes at one point in time built
inflexibility into the system it was attempting to develop. One of the advantages of the commercial
devices that emerged over time was the fact that they could be reconfigured as well as combined
with other devices, creating a much more flexible system.
Whatever their effect on individual insurance firms, these actions by the largest firms,
along with the market-mediated shifts of the smaller firms and the role of industry associations,
certainly influenced technological developments in directions that the life insurance industry as a
whole saw as desirable. The added printing and alphabetical capabilities allowed increasing
integration of clerical steps, reducing the repetition so characteristic of the insurance business and
eliminating many opportunities for transcription errors.
Focusing for a moment on the tabulating industry itself, we see that Hollerith's TMC and
successors C-T-R and IBM under Thomas J. Watson ultimately established and built on a first
mover advantage to become the clear leader in the tabulating industry. Only two challenges to
IBM's dominance were mounted, both based on technical improvements (real or promised) that
expanded the equipment's capabilities. These challenges were both encouraged by the insurance
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industry. As Campbell-Kelly has pointed out, the rental nature of the tabulating equipment industry
creates pressure on vendors to delay new introductions to avoid making existing equipment
obsolete. 11 5 The competition from Powers in particular pushed the industry leader to continue to
innovate, and to work more closely with major user industries such as life insurance. In spite of its
repeated technical innovations, Powers lacked the Chandlerian investment in marketing,
manufacturing, and management to challenge IBM successfully. The monetary and managerial
problems Powers faced until it became part of Remington Rand continually undercut its challenge,
and its position as a single and non-dominant division of the new combination with inadequate
managerial focus never allowed it to catch up. Moreover, the post-1928 card incompatibility forced
by IBM's patent on the rectangular holes of the 80-column card made it more difficult for it to
capture existing IBM business.
The on-going interaction between the life insurance and tabulating industries shaped both
industries in significant ways, setting the stage for continued interaction between the two industries
during the transition to computers beginning at mid-century. The relationship between the two
industries also reflects the co-evolution of tabulating technology development and use over time.
By looking at both sets of developments together we can appreciate the nature of the relationship
and the dynamic process by which it unfolded, each served as a shaping context for the other.
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